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By Zachary A. Strietelmeier 
 
 
Dialogue. 
A. Was I ill? and is it ended? 
Pray, by what physician tended? 
I recall no pain endured! 
B. Now I know your trouble’s ended. 
He that can forget, is cured.
1
 
 
According to the English monk and scholar known as the Venerable Bede, 
there exist three methods by which time is reckoned: custom, nature, and 
authority.
2
 To introduce these elements, Bede provides his own etymology for 
the word time (tempus). Considered in the plural, he explains that “times 
(tempora) take their name from ‘measure’ (temperamentum).”
3
 
Temperamentum, in turn, derives from the verb tempero, “to be moderate, to 
divide, to regulate.” Ergo, in addition to its function as a passive construct of 
custom, nature, and authority, time also assumes an active role—it moderates, it 
divides, it regulates.
4
 Writing in the early eighth century, Bede captures this 
paradoxical nature of time’s sovereignty, one which governs and is governed 
simultaneously, and thus he lays the groundwork for his own periodization 
schemata. Recently, however, such schemata have come under attack. A familiar 
example is the substitution of C.E. (Common Era) for A.D. (anno domini) in an 
attempt to extricate historical inquiry from the sacred.
5
 Not only is this particular 
division in question, but, today, periodization in general “finds itself in a very 
bad odor indeed.”
6
 Postmodern criticism of “the period,” by recognizing the dual 
functionality of time, as outlined by Bede, emphasizes its role as a political act. 
Most scholars now concur with Johannes Fabian’s assertion that time, if it is 
regulated by the politics of custom, nature, and authority, will regulate history 
with those same political phenomena. In other words, periodization has a 
                                                          
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science [1882], trans. Thomas Common, Paul V. Cohn, and 
Maude D. Petre (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2008), 2. 
2 Bede, The Reckoning of Time [8th century], trans. Faith Wallis (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1999), 13. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization 
Govern the Politics of Time (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 1. 
5 Ibid., 3. 
6 Lawrence Besserman, “The Challenge of Periodization: Old Paradigms and New 
Perspectives,” in The Challenge of Periodization: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives, ed. 
Lawrence Besserman (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996), 3. 
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political agenda.
7
 One temporal division central to this discourse on the “politics 
of time” is the tripartite periodization of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and 
Modernity. Through a detailed historiography of the ancient-medieval-modern 
schema, this essay contends that periodization of the Middle Ages reflects the 
socio-political environments in which it is perceived and thus imposes the same 
political agendas as a regulating function—that is, the medieval period survives 
more as a conceptual division than a temporal one. 
Like all political structures, this tripartite periodization of Western history 
builds upon historical paradigms that were present prior to its inception. The 
earliest temporal schemata developed from ancient myths and legends instituted 
by the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans. Yet, while Greek and Roman traditions 
supplied a plethora of time-reckoning techniques, the main source for Western 
(Judeo-Christian) periodization paradigms was biblical literature.
8
 For the 
scholars of Late Antiquity, the Bible served both as a historical account, 
providing a template for marking the past, and as a prophetic book, providing a 
method for interpreting the future.
9
 Perhaps the most influential periodization 
schema derived from biblical narrative was that known as the Six Ages of the 
World. In the late third century, Sextus Julius Africanus advanced an early but 
unorthodox version of this schema, asserting that each age equaled a thousand 
years, and thereby predicted the Second Coming of Christ around A.D. 500. 
Augustine, a century later, put forward his own division of the Six Ages of the 
World and, in response to Julius, made a point of declaring the duration of the 
“sixth age” unknowable.
10
 History, then, remained part of this undifferentiated 
“sixth age,” a true “middle age” (medium aevum) from the first coming of Christ 
to his Second Coming at the end of time.
11
 It is in the context of this ahistorical 
“sixth age” that Petrarch advocated a future resumption of history and thus 
inspired the tripartite periodization of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and 
Modernity.
12
 
Francesco Petrarca (1304-74), anglicized as Petrarch, reinvented the 
medieval periodization schema established by Augustine in the early fifth 
century, prompting the formation of the ancient/medieval and medieval/modern 
divisions of history. When Augustine asserted his Six-Ages-of-the-World 
schema, he set it alongside the Six Ages of Man, claiming that the world grows 
old and, like man, gets worse over time. By the fourteenth century, this birth-
                                                          
7 Davis, 2. 
8 Besserman, 5-6. 
9 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (1981; 
repr., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 29. 
10 Besserman, 7.  
11 Amos Funkenstein, “Periodization and Self-Understanding in the Middle Ages and Early 
Modern Times,” Medievalia et Humanistica: Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Culture 5 (1974): 
8. 
12 John Dagenais and Margaret R. Greer, “Decolonizing the Middle Ages: Introduction,” 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 30, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 435-36. 
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maturation-death paradigm was thoroughly ingrained into medieval thought.
13
 
Yet, Petrarch saw a hope of temporal resurrection, namely through the 
rediscovery of classical Rome. After a prolonged visit to Rome in 1341 for his 
coronation as poet laureate, Petrarch asked a correspondent the following 
question: “Who can doubt that Rome would rise up again if she but began to 
know herself?”
14
 Rome, in this case, referred to pagan and not Christian Rome, 
as Petrarch affirms in the same letter, drawing a boundary between what he 
considers to be ancient and modern history.
15
 Unlike the classical age of Rome, 
Petrarch believed the time in which he lived to be one shrouded in darkness, a 
“middle squalor” suspended between two “happier ages.”
16
 The darkness 
(tenebrae) that for the medieval person was characteristic of the pagan times 
preceding Christ, described for Petrarch the Christian times in which he lived.
17
 
In the final lines of his epic poem Africa (1338/9), Petrarch emphatically 
conveys this tenebrae along with his ardent hope for a classical revival: “My life 
is destined to be spent ’midst storms and turmoil. But…a more propitious age 
will come again…Our posterity, perchance, when the dark clouds are lifted, may 
enjoy once more the radiance the ancients knew.”
18
 In contrast to the 
Augustinian birth-maturation-death topos, Petrarch offers an alternative tripartite 
paradigm of birth-death-rebirth, one which can be equally imposed upon or 
extrapolated from events in the biblical narrative.
19
 So, even though Petrarch, in 
celebrating pagan classicism, introduced historical divisions to the ahistorical 
“sixth age,” his periodization schema still resided within the Judeo-Christian 
framework. 
Of course, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century scholars did not 
immediately embrace this novel method of periodization—the roots of the 
Christian universal histories had grown too deep.
20
 Even Vasari’s classic 
account of the so-called “rebirth” (la rinascità) of art, written in 1550, reflected 
the birth-maturation-death topos of Augustine. It was not until Polydore Vergil’s 
Historica Angilicae (1534) that a logical, scholastically recognized defense of 
the birth-death-rebirth model surfaced in northern Europe. Polydore, in this 
                                                          
13 Besserman, 7. 
14 Petrarch, Fam. 6.2, ed. Rossi, 2:58, quoted in Theodor E. Mommsen, “Petrarch’s Conception 
of the ‘Dark Ages,’” Speculum 17, no. 2 (April 1942): 232. “The etymological connection between 
media tempestas and tempest reflects a specialization in the meaning of tempestas from ‘time’ to 
‘period of time’ to ‘season’ to ‘stormy weather’ to ‘a specific type of storm.’” Dagenais, 
“Decolonizing the Middle Ages: Introduction,” 434n9. 
15 Mommsen, 233. 
16 Petrarch, Epistola metrica 3.33, lines 1-6, ed. F. Neri et al., Rime, Trionfi e poesie latine 
(Millan: Ricciardi, n.d.), 802, quoted in Dagenais, “Decolonizing the Middle Ages: Introduction,” 
433. 
17 Mommsen, 227. 
18 Petrarch, Petrarch’s Africa [1338-9], trans. Thomas G. Bergin and Alice S. Wilson (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 239, lines 634-41. 
19 Besserman, 8. 
20 Funkenstein, 9. 
TENOR OF OUR TIMES Spring 2013 
 
60 
work, adheres to the same life-cycle paradigm of Augustine but provides one 
notable caveat: he explains that nations, unlike human beings, are not restricted 
to a single lifetime.
21
 There were exceptions, however, to this tardy reception of 
the Petrarchan schema; they came largely from the Italian city-states, whose 
citizens had long rebuffed the claims of the Holy Roman Empire as well as the 
“transfer of rule” (translatio imperii) which gave it legitimacy. By rejecting the 
translatio imperii between the Roman and medieval empires, Italian 
Renaissance humanists simultaneously rejected a continuous universal history, 
and thus scholars like Leonardo Bruni (d. 1444) and Flavio Biondo (1392-1463) 
were more readily able to reference the ancient-medieval-modern periodization 
in their works.
22
 Throughout the 1500s and 1600s, many prominent scholars 
recognized and employed the temporal divisions outlined by Petrarch. Yet, it 
was Christoph Cellarius who first systematically organized Western history 
according to this tripartite schema, publishing his Universal History Divided 
into an Ancient, Medieval, and New Period just prior to 1700.
23
  
Many modern historians, including Fabian, consider the humanists’ 
rejection of the translatio imperii and their break from the continuous universal 
histories of Judeo-Christianity to be an “achieved secularization of time.” For 
these modern historians, Cellarius’ work marked a critical divide between sacred 
and secular history.
24
 However, Fabian’s famous critique on anthropology, Time 
and the Other, proved to be self-negating on this particular point. While, on the 
one hand, Fabian advocates the recognition of temporal politics, on the other, he 
further politicizes the medieval/modern divide by presupposing a corresponding 
sacred/secular divide.
25
 His assumption of such a sacred/secular rift in time 
consequently ignores many historical developments. For example, long before 
the Renaissance or the Enlightenment, Bede put forward an organized 
explanation of cyclic and linear time that was based on religious ideology, and 
these temporal constructions are still being used today.
26
 The recent substitution 
of C.E. for A.D. notwithstanding, the incarnation of Christ continues to define the 
foundation of chronological (linear) time. In fact, with this new nomenclature, 
the effect of Bede’s periodization is greater, as it employs the same mechanism 
of division (i.e. the incarnation) but operates under a secular and apparently 
                                                          
21 Besserman, 8. 
22 Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, 2nd ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 159. N.b. Polydore Vergil was born at Urbino in central Italy 
before Pope Alexander VI selected him for a tax-collecting office in England soon after 1500. 
Holding various church preferments, Polydore remained in England until 1550, when he purportedly 
returned to Urbino. 
23 Ibid., 181. 
24 Davis, 2-3. 
25 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object (1983; repr., 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 1-2. 
26 Davis, 106. 
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more universal façade.
27
 Karl Löwith, in his Meaning in History, makes a 
similar observation, asserting that modern historical concepts are merely 
secularized counterparts to the eschatological patterns found in Judeo-Christian 
ideology. By exposing the continuity between “sacred” and “secular” histories, 
Löwith seeks to undermine the popular claim that modern theory presents the 
only legitimate history and can therefore serve as a decisive sovereign of time 
(dividing the medieval/sacred from the modern/secular). Modern sovereignty, 
Löwith argues, disavows the very history upon which it is established.
28
 
Although these twentieth-century expositions on the secularization of time have 
had a significant impact on recent understandings of periodization, they actually 
underscore a preexisting attitude of triumphalism, one which dates back to 
Petrarch’s conception of the “dark ages.” 
The term “dark ages” was never primarily a scientific description but rather 
a “battle-cry,” a condemnation of medieval thought and culture as a whole. 
Propounded by scholars such as Voltaire and Gibbon, this slogan became most 
common during the Age of Enlightenment, a period whose very name attests to 
the disaffection between it and the preceding era of tenebrae.
29
 Voltaire, in his 
Essay on the Manners and Spirit of Nations (1756), bewails the Middle Ages as 
a time when “human nature was plunged, for such a series of ages, into this 
condition so similar, and in so many respects inferior to that of brutes…”
30
 He, 
not unlike the Renaissance scholars, celebrated the present and denigrated the 
past. In his Advice to a Journalist (1737), Voltaire writes the following: “As to 
the young, do instill in them a taste for the history of recent times, which to us is 
a matter of necessity, rather than ancient history, which is only a matter of 
curiosity.”
31
 Though not yet formulated as a method of periodization, the 
presentism of Voltaire greatly reflected the sacred/secular divide explored 
above. The “philosophy of history,” as defined by his influential Essay on 
Manners, was expressly distinguished from the theological interpretation found 
in medieval universal histories; reason and the will of man, not providence and 
the will of God, governed Voltaire’s historical inquiry.
32
 As a result, both 
Voltaire and Gibbon employed the founding of Constantinople as a symbol to 
inaugurate the decline of the Roman Empire.
33
 Indeed, much of Edward 
                                                          
27 Davis, 3. 
28 Ibid., 83-84. 
29 Mommsen, 227. 
30 Voltaire, An Essay on Universal History: The Manners, and Spirit of Nations, from the Reign 
of Charlemagne to the Age of Louis XIV, 2nd ed. [1756], trans. Nugent (London, 1759), 9. 
31 Voltaire, Counseils à un journaliste (May 10, 1737), in Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, ed. 
Louis Moland, 50 vols. (Paris: Garnier, 1877-85), 22:244, quoted in Pierre Force, “Voltaire and the 
Necessity of Modern History,” Modern Intellectual History 6, no. 3 (2009): 462. 
32 Karl Löwith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 1. 
33 Voltaire, Essay on Manners, 9. Cf. Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire [1776] (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1879), 503. “Standing first, ‘the 
foundation of Constantinople’ marks the culmination of that movement of empire to power-centres 
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Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776) drew 
from the popular achievements of Voltaire, as did the works of Hume and 
Robertson.
34
 Together, the scholarship of these “enlightened” historians did 
much to extend the perception of the “dark ages” first conveyed by Petrarch, and 
reinforced the notion that the medieval period was one unworthy of 
remembrance. 
Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the 
expression “dark ages” became increasingly restricted and was eventually 
altogether abandoned by medievalists. While The American Cyclopaedia of 
1883 still applied the term in its widest sense (ca. 400-1500), by the turn of the 
twentieth century, the “dark ages” no longer encompassed the full scope of the 
Middle Ages. Instead, as defined in the 1909 edition of The Americana, it 
represented only the time between the fall of the Roman Empire in A.D. 475 and 
the discovery of the Pandects at Amalfi in 1137.
35
 In turn, the fourteenth (1929) 
edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica did not even include the expression, 
explaining that “the contrast, once so fashionable, between the ages of darkness 
and the ages of light has no more truth to it than have the idealistic fancies 
which underlie attempts at medieval revivalism.”
36
 Yet, despite the absence of 
the term “dark ages” in the popular encyclopedia, the triumphalism of the 
Renaissance and Enlightenment has continued to pervade modern thought, 
especially in the form of monolithic sacred/secular and feudal/capitalist 
divides.
37
 In concluding her book, Periodization and Sovereignty, Kathleen 
Davis references a recent National Public Radio broadcast (aired 18 June 2007), 
which attributed the current unrest in Pakistan to the nation’s “ancient system of 
feudalism and privilege.” Essentially, the report maintained that if Pakistan 
could overcome these antiquated structures of government, it could act as a 
stable, useful ally to the U.S. in the war on terrorism.
38
 As conveyed in this NPR 
sound-bite, use of the term “feudalism”—not unlike Petrarch’s “dark ages”—
temporally distances its object from the modern world. In Davis’s words, “It 
allows reports such as this to deflect recent political events, and to attribute 
current problems in nations such as Pakistan simply to ‘ancient,’ ostensibly 
endemic, cultural factors.”
39
 So, despite the constant efforts of modern 
scholarship to eschew triumphalism, the perceptions of the Renaissance and 
Enlightenment thinkers have left an indelible impression on the Western mind. 
                                                                                                                                  
alibi quam Romae which Gibbon tells us had ‘started in his mind’ as a subject on the steps of the 
Capitol in 1764.” J. G. A. Pocock, Religion: The First Triumph, vol. 5 of Barbarism and Religion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4. 
34 Force, 458-459. 
35 Mommsen, 226. 
36 Ibid., 226. 
37 Davis, 2. 
38 Philip Reeves, “Pakistanis Criticize Influence of Feudal Families,” Morning Edition, 18 June 
2007, quoted in Davis, 132. 
39 Davis, 133. 
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The scholastic shift away from triumphalism largely precipitated from the 
series of events that took place in France between 1789 and 1815. During this 
period, the failure of the Jacobin radical experiment and the Napoleonic Empire 
left many scholars disenchanted with triumphalist ideology; the notion that a 
civilization could abolish its age-old traditions in favor of new, purely rational 
constructs to achieve a society of complete justice and happiness had proved 
erroneous. As a result, a resurgence of medieval scholarship emerged under 
nationalistic pursuits, defending the ancien régime as a fundamental part of both 
human progress and national identity.
40
 It is in this context that the German 
philosopher Georg Wilhelm F. Hegel (1770-1831) proposed his progressive 
model of cultural history, one which provided the Middle Ages with a functional 
role in the evolution of the state.
41
 Rejecting the birth-death-rebirth topos of 
Petrarch, Hegel introduced his own tripartite cultural model of history, reflecting 
the development of Spirit and Idea in what can be best described as an infancy-
adolescence-maturity schema.
42
 While this schema did not have much influence 
as a method of periodization, deviating significantly from the traditional 
ancient/medieval and medieval/modern divides, his incorporation of the Middle 
Ages into relevant history is critical to the postmodern discourse on temporal 
politics. Contrary to the philosophes that preceded him, Hegel championed the 
medieval Christian tradition over the Roman Empire, as it represented one more 
step toward the self-realization of the Spirit and toward the anthropological 
consciousness of freedom.
43
 To Hegel, history was in perpetual progress, and a 
society of liberté, egalité, and fraternité was yet to come. 
Implicit, though, in the continuous nature of the Hegelian dialectic, was a 
portrayal of the modern age as a transitional period.
44
 Framed within the context 
of a demarcated past and a definite future, Modernity became ahistorical and 
nonhomogeneous to many of the nineteenth-century scholars. Just as Petrarch 
had decried the “middle squalor” in which he lived, so these Romantics 
maligned the modern times on behalf of their parenthetical character.
45
 Victor 
Hugo, for example, after an exhausting survey of fifteenth-century Paris in 
Notre-Dame de Paris (1831), candidly writes the following concerning the 
city’s modern condition: “The present Paris has therefore no general 
physiognomy. It is a collection of specimens of several different ages, and the 
finest of all have disappeared.”
46
 Particularly egregious to Hugo was the 
historical eclecticism he witnessed in the nineteenth century, the remnants of the 
                                                          
40 Breisach, 228-229. 
41 Shlomo Aveneri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (1972; repr., New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 240. 
42 Besserman, 9. 
43 Aveneri, 227-228. 
44 Göran Blix, “Charting the ‘Transitional Period’: The Emergence of Modern Time in the 
Nineteenth Century,” History and Theory 45 (February 2006): 52. 
45 Ibid., 55. 
46 Victor Hugo, Hunchback of Notre Dame [1831] (Boston: Little, Brown, 1899), 197. 
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ancien régime, the Revolution, and the Empire all coexisting in one temporally 
pluralistic society. The modern age had no physionomie and no homogeneity.
47
 
In contrast, the medieval revivalism of the Romantic era had a decisive 
“homogenizing thrust.”
48
 Seeking to secure proper nationalist forms, especially 
in France, scholars synthesized the école narrative and the école analytique to 
give histories that both celebrated and clarified national identity.
49
 
Fundamentally, the movement transformed periodization methodology, defining 
each period by distinct traits that emerged from the historical process itself. Of 
course, this relativism was not without precedent. Giambattista Vico, in his 
Scienza Nuova (1725), had previously attempted to determine periods from 
within, employing terms such as “harmony,” “correspondence,” and 
“accommodation” throughout his discourse.
50
 Likewise, theologian Johann 
Gottfried Herder, writing in 1774, had argued that a period should only be 
referenced according to its own cultural standards and not to the norms of 
antiquity.
51
 In this respect, both Vico and Herder significantly influenced the 
Romantic scholars who succeeded them. Their push for relativistic periodization 
precipitated a vast tableau of historical inquiries, from the analytical works of 
Augustin Thierry and Jules Michelet to the popular novels of Walter Scott and 
Prosper Merimée.
52
 The medieval revivalism of the nineteenth century was, at 
its core, a continuation of Petrarchan logic: it celebrated the distinct, 
homogenous periods of the past and denigrated the transitional nature of the 
present. 
Over against the contentions of Norman F. Cantor, author of Inventing the 
Middle Ages (1991), late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholarship 
was very much an extension of—and not a divergence from—this Romantic 
medieval revivalism, exhibiting the same “homogenizing thrust” and driven by 
similar pursuits of nationalism.
53
 Moreover, with regards to its effect on 
medieval studies, the years between 1914 and 1945 differed little from those 
surrounding the French Revolution. According to Cantor, “Creating a medieval 
world picture and projecting themselves into it were one therapeutic recourse by 
which sensitive and benign twentieth-century people sought to regain their 
sanity and get control of their feelings in the times of slaughter and madness.”
54
 
The quest to define (and escape) the transitional age of Modernity continued to 
                                                          
47 Blazac, “Complaintes satiriques sur les moeurs du temps present” [1830], in Oeuvres 
diverses (Paris: Gallimard-Pléiade, 1996), 2:740, quoted in Blix, 57-58. 
48 Blix, 52. 
49 Breisach, 239. Cf. Douglas Johnson, “Historians,” in The French Romantics, ed. D. G. 
Charlton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 283. 
50 Funkenstein, 1-2. 
51 Blix, 52-53. 
52 Breisach, 239-242. 
53 Norman F. Cantor, Inventing the Middle Ages: The Lives, Works, and Ideas of the Great 
Medievalists in the Twentieth Century (New York: William Morrow, 1991), 36. Cf. Blix, 52-53. 
54 Cantor, 43. 
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permeate medieval scholarship from the nineteenth through the twentieth 
century. In this context, English jurist and historian F. W. Maitland co-authored 
the seminal work entitled The History of English Law before the Time of 
Edward I (1895). Historically interpreting the origins of English law within a 
medieval framework, Maitland effectively defines British national identity via 
the Middle Ages. For Maitland, the years between 1154 and 1272 are not 
inferior to Modernity but rather superior; they, unlike the obfuscated times of 
the present, comprise “a luminous age throwing light on both past and future.”
55
  
During the twentieth century, there emerged a variety of critiques regarding 
the placement of the ancient/medieval and medieval/modern divides, shifting the 
dates of those temporal divisions to make the intervening periods more 
homogenous. Henri Pirenne, examining ancient economic trends in his 
Mohammed and Charlemagne (1937), posits that the beginning of the Middle 
Ages should be marked by the advance of Islam and not the Germanic invasions, 
as it was the former that disrupted the Mediterranean unity of the ancient 
world.
56
 Note that here, in Pirenne’s depiction of the ensuing medieval period, 
the Romantic vocabulary of Hugo appears once again: “Europe…assumed a new 
physiognomy (physionomie)…”
57
 Like Pirenne, Maitland, and the Romantics, 
Cantor also looks to the Middle Ages as a homogenous past that can help better 
define the present, and thus he too can be considered as part of the nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century medieval revivalism. Accordingly, based on his own 
perceptions of cultural frustration with the transitional nature of Modernity, 
Cantor concludes his work with a prediction of “retromedievalism” for the 
twenty-first century.
58
 Cantor’s prediction, however, was incorrect. 
Long before twenty-first century, scholars had begun deconstructing the 
traditional ancient-medieval-modern schema as contemporaneous critiques of 
synchronic and diachronic periodization emerged in modern thought. R. G. 
Collingwood, an early twentieth-century English historian and philosopher, 
emphatically disparaged synchronic period discrimination, relating such 
categorizations to the respective knowledge and ignorance of the historian who 
invented them. In his “metaphysical epilegomena” to The Idea of History 
(1946), Collingwood wrote the following: 
 
Every period of which we have competent knowledge (and by 
competent knowledge I mean insight into its thought, not mere 
acquaintance with its remains) appears in the perspective of time as an 
age of brilliance: the brilliance being the light of our own historical 
                                                          
55 Frederick Pollock and Frederic W. Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of 
Edward I, 2nd ed. (1898; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 672-673. 
56 Henri Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne (1939; repr., New York: Barnes and Noble, 
1958), 284. 
57 Ibid., 285. 
58 Cantor, 411-412. 
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insight. The intervening periods are seen by contrast as…’dark ages’: 
ages which we know to have existed…but in which we can find no real 
life because we cannot re-enact that thought in our minds. That this 
pattern of light and darkness is an optical illusion proceeding from the 
distribution of the historian’s knowledge and ignorance is obvious…
59
 
 
In turn, it was Marc Bloch, medievalist and co-founder of the Annales school of 
history, who offered a powerful critique to periodization in terms of diachrony. 
He contended that historians should “look to the phenomena themselves for the 
proper periods” lest they engender absurd descriptions of events, like 
“Diplomatic history of Europe from Newton to Einstein.”
60
 Considering, in The 
Historian’s Craft (1949), how the Middle Ages came to be separated from the 
Renaissance, Bloch decried this partition and the “Voltarian stamp” that was 
now borne by history. Furthermore, he derided historians for their prudent 
sequencing of centuries and inevitable tendency to homogenize those events 
which took place within a hundred-year span.
61
 The observations of both 
Collingwood and Bloch regarding problems of synchronic and diachronic 
periodization set the stage for a postmodern deconstruction of the Middle Ages 
and, ultimately, periods in general. 
It was in response to these questions of periodization that French 
theoretician Michel Foucault reformulated the problem of temporal divisions in 
terms of “power and knowledge.”
62
 As with Collingwood’s concept of 
knowledge as an “illuminating agent,” Foucault posits that higher, or more 
empirical, orders of knowledge become increasingly discontinuous because “the 
rhythm of transformation doesn’t follow the smooth, continuist schemas of 
development which are normally accepted.”
63
 Therefore, the dominant 
schemata, such as the dialogues of Augustine, Petrarch, and Hegel, only 
achieved their supremacy via the exclusion of other dialogues, ones which did 
not conform to the established pattern.
64
 Foucault, subsequently, sought to 
dismantle these structures. His impetus was not unique but rather drew from a 
close reading of the nineteenth-century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who, 
along with Foucault, inscribed himself into his own historical narrative as a 
millennial moment, dismantling the older constructs to make way for a new 
order of thinking.
65
 Foucault’s definition of the period, found in his Archaeology 
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of Knowledge (1969), corresponds directly to this deconstructionist ideology: 
“The period is neither its basic unity, nor its horizon, nor its object: if it speaks 
of these things it is always in terms of discursive practices, and as a result of its 
analyses.”
66
 In other words, like the periodization schemata, the period itself is 
superficial; if it ever achieves homogeneity or distinction, it only does so 
through the exclusion of historical knowledge. Hence, Johannes Fabian affirms, 
“there is a ‘Politics of Time.’”
67
 Concerning medieval scholarship, the 
philosophy of Foucault undeniably propelled twenty-first-century efforts to 
deconstruct the Middle Ages, conveying with it the simple notion that, by 
remembering the Middle Ages, one simultaneously forgets all outlying 
phenomena. 
Postmodern discourse on the Petrarchan tripartite periodization of 
Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and Modernity has, in recent years, adopted for its 
use the geographic terms of colonization/ decolonization. Many scholars of the 
twenty-first century now contend that time, like land, can be and has been 
colonized for the purposes of political domination and exploitation.
68
 In 
addition, these postcolonial analyses reveal that the temporal colonization of the 
Middle Ages helped foster the territorial imperialism that characterizes the 
modern age. The Petrarchan construction of an irrational and superstitious 
medieval period identified later colonial subjects by similar pejorative terms.”
69
 
In the same manner that Petrarch and the Renaissance scholars denied the 
“coevalness [sic]” of the Middle Ages, so too the conquering Europeans denied 
the native histories of the lands they colonized.
70
 To a great extent, as Kathleen 
Davis argues in her Periodization and Sovereignty (2008), these derogatory 
conceptions of the “other” continue to plague popular modern thought, 
exemplified by NPR’s use of the term “feudalism” cited above.
71
 However, the 
relationship between the Middle Ages and Modernity is interdependent, and, as 
triumphalism and nationalism cease to be prevailing ideologies in academia, the 
concepts of “medievalism” and “modernism” will, likewise, cease to exist in the 
scholarly sphere, except possibly as the discursive formations of Foucault. John 
Dagenais, co-author of “Decolonizing the Middle Ages” (2000), writes that 
medievalism, being the “creation of a certain form of modernity…cannot 
survive the demise of that form of modernity—nor should we expect it to.”
72
 A 
certain set of politics comprises the ancient-medieval-modern periodization 
                                                          
66 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge [1969] and the Discourse on Language, 
trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 176. 
67 Fabian, xl. 
68 Dagenais, “Decolonizing the Middle Ages: Introduction,” 431. 
69 Davis, 20. 
70 John Dagenais, “The Postcolonial Laura,” Modern Language Quarterly 65, no. 3 (September 
2004): 367. 
71 Davis, 32-34. 
72 Dagenais, “The Postcolonial Laura,” 367-378. 
TENOR OF OUR TIMES Spring 2013 
 
68 
schema, and, when those political forces no longer retain their sovereignty, the 
structures established under their rule collapse. 
It is, therefore, the task of the modern historian to sail between Scylla and 
Charybdis, between the extremes of nihilism and naïve teleology. On the one 
hand, the total deconstruction of historical paradigms would effectively reduce 
history to entropic nothingness. If scholars are to define historical events by the 
“phenomena themselves,” then what is the definition of an event? Bede, in his 
eighth-century treatise On Times, explicated and delineated time’s smallest unit: 
the moment (momentum).
73
 Yet, postmodern thought deconstructs even this 
foundational unit of periodization, it being irrational to decry the century and 
preserve the second. Indeed, by deconstructing the “moments” of the past, 
postmodern scholars implicitly sketch the continuum of history as one infinite 
transitional period, nonhomogeneous and ahistorical.
74
 On the other hand, 
temporal divisions do have political agendas, and often they are used to 
dominate and exploit subaltern traditions. In this respect, the Middle Ages have 
served amphibiously, employed by both eighteenth-century triumphalists to 
celebrate Modernity and nineteenth-century Romantics to malign it. Most of all, 
though, the act of periodization engenders a dangerous “homogenizing thrust,” a 
desire to fit a host of incongruous events into a singularly progressive narrative. 
Searching for a temporal sovereign (that is, a means of temporal division), the 
historian creates his own. In the words of Michel de Certeau, “[Periodization] 
promotes a selection between what can be understood and what must be 
forgotten in order to obtain the representation of a present intelligibility.”
75
 Ergo, 
periodization is useful but also dangerous, and the modern historian must 
approach his subject—be it the Middle Ages or any other period—with open 
eyes. 
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